
Understanding the Relations Between Different Forms of Racial Prejudice: A Cognitive Consistency Perspective

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Research on racial prejudice is currently characterized by the existence of diverse concepts (e.g., implicit prejudice, old-fashioned racism, modern racism, aversive racism) that are not well integrated from a general perspective. The present article proposes an integrative framework for these concepts employing a cognitive consistency perspective. Specifically, it is argued that the reliance on immediate affective reactions toward racial minority groups in evaluative judgments about these groups depends on the consistency of this evaluation with other relevant beliefs pertaining to central components of old-fashioned, modern, and aversive forms of prejudice. A central prediction of the proposed framework is that the relation between “implicit” and “explicit” prejudice should be moderated by the interaction of egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals and perceptions of discrimination. This prediction was confirmed in a series of three studies. Implications for research on prejudice are discussed.

Keywords: *aversive racism; cognitive consistency; implicit prejudice; modern racism; old-fashioned racism*

Since Allport's (1954) seminal publication on “the nature of prejudice,” racial discrimination has been a topic of major interest in social psychology. One of the primary conclusions that has been drawn from this research is that the overt expression of prejudiced beliefs about racial minorities has continuously declined over the past decades (e.g., Schuhman, Steeh, Bobo, & Kyrsan, 1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997). However, racial

prejudice still seems to be prevalent in more subtle forms (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Katz, 1981). Thus, it is often argued that racial prejudice has simply changed its face, rather than been abandoned. This assumption is a guiding principle in contemporary research on racism, which postulates subtle forms of racial prejudice such as modern racism (McConahay, 1986), aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), or implicit prejudice (Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999).

Somewhat surprisingly, the development of these concepts occurred relatively independently, resulting in almost equally independent research programs. For example, research on implicit social cognition usually contrasts “implicit” prejudice, as assessed with the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), or affective priming (Fazio, Jackson,

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Dunton, & Williams, 1995) with “explicit” prejudice, as assessed with traditional self-report measures.¹ However, research in this tradition rarely distinguishes between different variants of “explicit” prejudice, such as old-fashioned racism or modern racism (cf. McConahay, 1986; Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). In a similar vein, research on aversive racism incorporated the notion of “implicit” prejudice by arguing that aversive racists can be characterized by a conflict between (explicit) egalitarian goals and (implicit) negative feelings toward racial minority groups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). However, the relation between aversive racism and modern racism (McConahay, 1986) has rarely been the subject of extensive theoretical or empirical investigations. Thus, research on racial prejudice is currently characterized by the existence of diverse concepts (e.g., implicit prejudice, old-fashioned racism, modern racism, aversive racism) that are not well integrated from a general perspective.

In the present article, we propose a theoretical framework that aims at integrating several concepts of contemporary research on racial prejudice. Specifically, we argue that the concepts proposed by different theories of racial prejudice can be understood in terms of their contribution to a consistent system of race-related beliefs. For this purpose, we first provide a brief overview of different concepts of racial prejudice. We then outline the theoretical basis for our integrative framework: the distinction between associative and propositional processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and their relation to the notion of cognitive consistency (see Gawronski, Strack, & Bodenhausen, in press). Based on our integrative analysis of different forms of racial prejudice, we then present three studies that tested a major implication of our theoretical framework, namely, the interactive influence of “implicit” prejudice, discriminatory beliefs, and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals on the endorsement of negative evaluations of racial minority groups.

Concepts of Racial Prejudice

Theories of subtle prejudice have their roots in the observation that public opinion polls in North America showed a steady decline in negative evaluations of racial minority groups after World War II, with racial conflicts showing only a moderate reduction (Campbell, 1971; Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971; Taylor, Sheatsley, & Greeley, 1978). This dissociation is often explained by the emergent conflict between *old-fashioned racism* and the increasing importance of egalitarian values (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986). Specifically, it is argued that old-fashioned racism includes the endorsement of nonegalitarian beliefs, such as support for segregation and open discrimination. These nonegalitarian beliefs stand in contrast to the modern ideal of equality

and equal opportunity, thereby leading to a decline in old-fashioned forms of prejudice. However, as noted earlier, this decline does not necessarily lead to a corresponding reduction in negative sentiments against racial minorities.

Theories of *modern racism* argue that the implied conflict between egalitarian goals and negative sentiments simply leads to a change in the expression of racial prejudice. Rather than being reflected in support of racial segregation and open discrimination, negative sentiments against racial minorities are assumed to find their expression in discriminatory beliefs, namely, in the proposition that racial discrimination no longer exists (McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995). According to McConahay (1986), this notion includes four related subcomponents:

- (1) Discrimination is a thing of the past because Blacks now have the freedom to compete in the marketplace and to enjoy those things they can afford.
- (2) Blacks are pushing too hard, too fast and into places where they are not wanted.
- (3) These tactics and demands are unfair.
- (4) Therefore, recent gains are undeserved and the prestige granting institutions of society are giving Blacks more attention and the concomitant status than they deserve. (p. 92)

This type of modern prejudice differs from the old-fashioned support of segregation in that proponents of these discriminatory beliefs do not consider them as constituents of prejudice but as empirical facts.

A similar notion is implied in Gaertner and Dovidio’s theory of aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). A central tenet in aversive racism theory is the conflict between negative feelings toward racial minority members and the personal desire to be nonprejudiced. The conflict between the two components is further assumed to result in a state of attitudinal ambivalence such that attitudes toward racial minorities are not uniformly positive or negative. Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) labeled this state of ambivalence *aversive racism*, which “represents a particular type of ambivalence in which the conflict is between feelings and beliefs associated with a sincerely egalitarian value system and unacknowledged negative feelings and beliefs about blacks” (p. 62). Another important aspect of aversive racism is that the negative feelings that lead to racial ambivalence are not hostile or vicious. Instead, the feelings held by aversive racists tend to involve discomfort, uneasiness, or fear, which may lead to avoidance behavior despite the personal importance of egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals.

The reorientation in the study of racial prejudice was recently enriched by a methodological advancement in the measurement of attitudes, namely, the development

of indirect measures such as the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and affective priming (Fazio et al., 1995). A common assumption in research employing these measures is that they assess “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 8). In the context of racial groups, these traces of past experience are often called *implicit prejudice*, which is contrasted with *explicit prejudice* assessed by traditional self-report measures (e.g., Rudman et al., 1999). Even though most researchers in the domain of “implicit” prejudice do not discuss the theoretical background of different forms of “explicit” prejudice, the idea of potential dissociations between “explicit” and “implicit” evaluations has been incorporated into aversive racism theory (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004). Specifically, it is assumed that indirect measures tap the negative feelings experienced by aversive racists, which may be in conflict with egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals reflected in traditional self-report measures (e.g., Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Grunfeld, Robichaud, & Zanna, 2005).

Despite obvious similarities in their theoretical background (e.g., the increased importance of egalitarian values) and their common concern with subtle forms of racial prejudice, the relations between different theories of racial prejudice are often inconclusive and difficult to understand as there is no integrative model that incorporates all of the components proposed by these theories. In the following sections, we outline a general framework that aims at providing such an integration, thereby granting a more systematic analysis of the relations between the components of race-related belief systems.

Associative Versus Propositional Processes

In the proposed framework, we distinguish between two different types of evaluative responses, affective reactions and evaluative judgments, which are claimed to have their roots in two distinct, though interrelated, processes: associative and propositional processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Specifically, we argue that people experience either positive or negative affective reactions toward an object depending on the particular associations that are activated in response to that object. These affective reactions are further assumed to provide the basis for evaluative judgments, unless the evaluation implied by the affective response is inconsistent with other relevant information that is momentarily considered. Such consistency assessments represent the core feature of propositional processes, which aim at validating momentarily available information.²

The propositional process of consistency-based validation plays an important role for our integrative framework of racial prejudice. Gawronski and Bodenhausen (2006) argued that the perceived validity of a cognitive element—such as the evaluation implied by an affective reaction—depends on the consistency of this element with other elements that are considered to be relevant for a given judgment. In the case of evaluative judgments, such elements may include nonevaluative beliefs referring to states of affairs in the world or evaluative beliefs about other attitude objects (Jones & Gerard, 1967). If the evaluation implied by an affective reaction is consistent with other relevant beliefs, it may be considered valid and thus may serve as the basis for an evaluative judgment. If, however, the evaluation implied by an affective reaction is inconsistent with other relevant beliefs, people will aim at achieving consistency in their system of beliefs to avoid uncomfortable feelings of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). One possibility to achieve consistency is to reject—or invalidate—the evaluation implied by an affective reaction. However, mere rejections of affective reactions do not necessarily deactivate the associations that gave rise to these reactions (Deutsch, Gawronski, & Strack, 2006). Thus, inconsistency-related rejections can lead to dissociations between immediate affective reactions and evaluative judgments such that affective reactions may persist despite inconsistency-related changes in evaluative judgments (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004).

Different Forms of Racial Prejudice

These assumptions can also be applied to the endorsement of negative judgments about social groups. For example, with regard to racial prejudice, an individual may experience a negative affective reaction to Black people, which is driven by the valence of all evaluative associations that are activated in response to Black people. Whether or not this affective reaction leads to a negative judgment about Black people (i.e., “I dislike Black people”) should further depend on the consistency of this evaluation with other beliefs that are considered to be relevant. In the case of racial prejudice, such beliefs may include egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals and perceived discrimination of Black people. More precisely, the resulting set of judgment-relevant elements may include the following three propositions (see Figure 1, Panel A):

1. “I dislike Black people.”
2. “Negative evaluations of disadvantaged minority groups are wrong.”
3. “Black people represent a disadvantaged minority group.”




Figure 1 Interplay Between Affective Reactions and Propositional Beliefs in Racial Prejudice Against Black People.
 NOTE: Panel A depicts the case of an inconsistent belief system resulting from negative affective reactions toward Black people; Panels B, C, and D depict consistent belief systems, including central components of different forms of racial prejudice.

These three propositions are inconsistent with each other in that they cannot be endorsed simultaneously without violating the basic notion of cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957). Proposition 1 is inconsistent with the joint implication of Propositions 2 and 3; Proposition 2 is inconsistent with the joint implication of Propositions 1 and 3; and Proposition 3 is inconsistent with the joint implication of Propositions 1 and 2. Thus, in order to avoid uncomfortable feelings of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), cognitive consistency has to be maintained by rejecting at least one of the three propositions (Gawronski & Strack, 2004).³ The three possible cases are illustrated in Figure 1 (Panels B, C, D).

First, people may reject the proposition representing egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals (e.g., “I don’t care about disadvantaged minority groups”). In this case, people may still agree that Black people represent a disadvantaged minority group. However, this belief does not result in a rejection of negative affective reactions as a basis for evaluative judgments as negative judgments of disadvantaged minorities are considered to be acceptable. Thus, negative affective reactions to Black people may directly translate into negative judgments (see Figure 1, Panel B). This belief component plays a significant role in theories of old-fashioned racism: People reject nonprejudicial, egalitarian values and openly support racial discrimination (McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995).

Second, people may reject the proposition representing discriminatory beliefs (e.g., “Black people do not represent a disadvantaged minority group”). In this case, people may still hold strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. However, these goals do not result in a rejection of negative affective reactions to Black people as a basis for evaluative judgments as Black people are not considered to be a target of discrimination (Franco & Maass, 1999). Accordingly, negative affective reactions may directly translate into negative judgments (see Figure 1, Panel C). This belief component plays a central role in theories of modern racism: People deny the continued discrimination of racial minority groups (McConahay, 1986).

Third, people may reject their negative affective reactions as a valid basis for an evaluative judgment (e.g., “I like Black people”). Such a rejection may occur when people hold strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals and at the same time agree that Black people represent a disadvantaged minority group. In this case, negative affective reactions to Black people will *not* translate into negative judgments about this group (see Figure 1, Panel D). Rather, people’s evaluative judgments should be relatively neutral (or even positive) irrespective of the valence of their affective reactions. Importantly, the mere rejection—or invalidation—of affective reactions as a basis for evaluative judgments

does not necessarily deactivate the associations that gave rise to these reactions (Gawronski & Strack, 2004; see also Butler et al., 2003; Gross, 1998). Thus, even though negative affective reactions may not be reflected in evaluative judgments, affective reactions may still be negative. This case may be regarded as the one described in theories of aversive racism: People hold strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals and believe that racial minority groups are disadvantaged but nevertheless experience negative feelings toward these groups even though these feelings are not reflected in negative judgments (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).

The Present Research

Drawing on the assumption that measures of “implicit” prejudice provide a proxy of people’s feelings toward racial groups (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004) via the assessment of activated associations that give rise to these feelings (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the proposed framework implies specific predictions about the relation between “implicit” prejudice reflected in indirect measures and “explicit” prejudice reflected in direct evaluative judgments. In particular, our model implies that the relation between “implicit” and “explicit” prejudice should be moderated by the *interaction* of perceived discrimination and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. More precisely, direct evaluative judgments (or the degree of “explicit” prejudice) should reflect the valence of immediate affective reactions (or the degree of “implicit” prejudice) when either perceived discrimination or nonprejudicial goals are low. However, direct evaluative judgments (or the degree of “explicit” prejudice) should be unrelated to immediate affective reactions (or the degree of “implicit” prejudice) when both perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals are high. In other words, people should base their evaluative judgments about a racial group on their immediate affective reactions toward this group when either (a) they do not believe that this group is a target of racial discrimination or (b) they do not endorse egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. In contrast, immediate affective reactions should *not* be reflected in evaluative judgments when people (a) believe that the group is a target of racial discrimination and at the same time (b) hold strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. Study 1 tested these predictions using two different variants of the IAT as a measure of “implicit” prejudice (Greenwald et al., 1998; Olson & Fazio, 2004); Studies 2 and 3 aimed to replicate the findings obtained in Study 1 using a variant of Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart’s (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) and two different sets of self-report measures of perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals.

STUDY 1

The main goal of Study 1 was to provide a first test of the proposed framework by investigating the interactive effect of perceived discrimination and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals on the relation between “implicit” and “explicit” prejudice against Black people. In the present study, “implicit” prejudice—or immediate affective reactions resulting from activated associations—was assessed with two variants of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; Olson & Fazio, 2004); “explicit” prejudice—or direct evaluative judgments—was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). In addition, we assessed nonprejudicial goals with Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (MCPR) and perceived discrimination with McConahay’s (1986) Modern Racism Scale (MRS). Applied to these operationalizations, the proposed framework predicts a three-way interaction between IAT scores, perceived discrimination, and nonprejudicial goals in the prediction of feeling thermometer scores. Specifically, IAT scores of “implicit” prejudice should be positively related with feeling thermometer scores of “explicit” prejudice when either (a) perceived discrimination is low or (b) nonprejudicial goals are weak. However, the two measures should be unrelated when perceived discrimination is high and at the same time nonprejudicial goals are strong.

Method

Participants. In Study 1, 140 undergraduate students at the University of Western Ontario (105 female; 35 male) participated in a study on “attitudes and attention” in return for course credit. Of these, 3 participants identified themselves as Black or African. Excluding these participants from analyses did not change any of the results reported in the following.

Measures. Participants first completed an IAT designed to assess “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. Because of recent controversies regarding the nature of associations assessed with the standard IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004), two different variants of the IAT were employed. The first variant used the standard IAT procedure proposed by Greenwald et al. (1998); the second variant used the personalized IAT procedure proposed by Olson and Fazio (2004). Half of the participants completed the standard IAT; the remaining half completed the personalized IAT.

In the standard IAT, participants were first presented with pictures of Black and White faces that had to be categorized according to their skin color. Specifically, participants were asked to press a left-hand key (A)

when the face was Black and a right-hand key (*Numpad 5*) when the face was White. In the second block, participants were presented with positive and negative words that had to be categorized according to their valence. Participants were asked to press the left-hand key when the word was negative and the right-hand key when the word was positive. In the third block, the two discrimination tasks were combined with a prejudice-congruent key assignment. Participants were asked to press the left-hand key when they saw either a Black face or a negative word and the right-hand key when they saw either a White face or a positive word. In the fourth block, participants were again presented with Black and White faces. However, the original key assignment of the first block was now reversed. Specifically, participants were asked to press the left-hand key when the face was White and the right-hand key when the face was Black. Finally, the fifth block again combined the two discrimination tasks, now in a prejudice-incongruent manner. Specifically, participants were asked to press the left-hand key when they saw either a White face or a negative word and the right-hand key when they saw either a Black face or a positive word.

The personalized IAT was identical to the standard IAT with the following two exceptions. First, instead of categorizing positive and negative attribute words according to their normative valence, participants were asked to indicate whether they like or dislike the objects denoted by the words. This difference was further emphasized by the labels of the two response keys. Whereas the keys in the standard IAT were labeled *positive* versus *negative*, the keys in the personalized IAT were labeled *I like* versus *I dislike*. Second, the two IAT variants differed with regard to error feedback. Whereas in the standard IAT, incorrect responses were indicated with the word *ERROR!* for 1000 ms in the center of the screen, the personalized IAT did not include any error feedback.

The practice blocks of the two IAT variants each included a total of 24 trials (Blocks 1, 2, and 4); the critical test blocks each included a total of 48 trials (Blocks 3 and 5). The stimulus items consisted of a total of 12 positive words, 12 negative words, and pictures of 3 Black males, 3 Black females, 3 White males, and 3 White females. Positive words were: *gifts, vacations, friends, sunrise, summer, harmony, freedom, honesty, health, fun, relaxation, love*. Negative words were: *terrorists, spiders, stink, cockroaches, viruses, vomit, cancer, rotten, grief, pollution, stress, wasps*. The stimulus material was identical for the two IAT variants. In both IAT variants, participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible without making too many errors.

Immediately after the IAT, participants were asked to complete several questionnaires regarding their personal

beliefs. The first part consisted of several feeling thermometer scales in which participants were asked to indicate the “warmth or positivity” versus the “coolness or negativity” of their feelings associated with different ethnic groups. The groups rated included Whites and Blacks as target categories and Asians, Hispanics, and Inuit as filler items. Ratings were assessed with 7-point scales ranging from 1 (*very cold*) to 7 (*very warm*). The second part consisted of McConahay’s (1986) Modern Racism Scale as a measure of perceived discrimination.⁴ Finally, the third part included Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale as a measure of nonprejudicial goals. Both perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals were assessed with 5-point rating scales.

Results

Preliminary analyses. IAT scores of “implicit” prejudice were aggregated according to the D-600 scoring algorithm proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). Scores were calculated such that higher values indicate a stronger “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. Feeling thermometer ratings of Blacks and Whites were aggregated into a single index by subtracting the mean positivity ratings for Blacks from the mean positivity ratings for Whites. Thus, higher values indicate a stronger “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. Indices of perceived discrimination (Modern Racism Scale) and nonprejudicial goals (Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale) were aggregated by first recoding items with a negative polarization and then calculating the respective mean values for the two scales. Ratings were aggregated such that higher values indicate higher perceived discrimination and stronger nonprejudicial goals, respectively.⁵ Means and standard deviations of all measures are reported in Table 1. Replicating previous findings by Olson and Fazio (2004), “implicit” prejudice scores tended to be somewhat lower for the personalized as compared to the standard IAT, $F(1, 138) = 2.97, p = .09, \eta^2 = .021$.

Correlations. Correlations between all measures are reported in Table 2. Scores of “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks were uncorrelated with any of the self-report measures, regardless of whether “implicit” prejudice was assessed with the personalized IAT or the standard IAT. Perceived discrimination showed a significant negative correlation to “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks such that higher perceived discrimination was associated with lower levels of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. In addition, a significant positive correlation between perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals indicated that higher

TABLE 1: Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (EP), and Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks Assessed With the Standard IAT (IAT-S) and the Personalized IAT (IAT-P), Study 1

	N	M	SD
PD	140	3.61	0.58
NPG	140	3.27	0.50
EP	140	0.44	1.56
IAT-S	71	0.53	0.48
IAT-P	69	0.37	0.58

NOTE: Perceived discrimination was assessed with McConahay’s (1986; Table 2) Modern Racism Scale; nonprejudicial goals were assessed with Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale; “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz’s (1998) standard version of the Implicit Association Test or Olson and Fazio’s (2004) personalized variant of the Implicit Association Test.

TABLE 2: Zero-Order Correlations Between Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (EP), and Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks Assessed With the Standard IAT (IAT-S) and the Personalized IAT (IAT-P), Study 1

	PD	NPG	EP	IAT
1. PD	(.66)			
2. NPG	.24**	(.75)		
3. EP	-.31***	-.09	(—)	
4. IAT-S	-.03	-.08	.04	(.56)
5. IAT-P	-.11	-.02	.18	(.64)

NOTE: Perceived discrimination was assessed with McConahay’s (1986; Table 2) Modern Racism Scale; nonprejudicial goals were assessed with Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale; “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz’s (1998) standard version of the Implicit Association Test or Olson and Fazio’s (2004) personalized variant of the Implicit Association Test. Cronbach’s α estimates of internal consistency are in parentheses.

** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

levels of perceived discrimination were associated with stronger nonprejudicial goals. “Explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was unrelated to nonprejudicial goals.

Regression analyses. The framework proposed in the present article suggests that zero-order correlations are insufficient to understand the relation between different components of racial prejudice. Instead, our conceptualization implies that nonprejudicial goals and perceived discrimination of Blacks should *interactively* determine whether negative affective reactions to Blacks (“implicit” prejudice) lead to the endorsement of negative evaluations of Blacks (“explicit” prejudice). More precisely, it is predicted that “explicit” prejudice should

be directly related to “implicit” prejudice when either perceived discrimination of Blacks *or* nonprejudicial goals are low. However, “implicit” prejudice should be unrelated to “explicit” prejudice when both perceived discrimination of Blacks *and* nonprejudicial goals are high. In other words, the proposed framework implies a three-way interaction in the prediction of feeling thermometer scores such that IAT scores should predict feeling thermometer scores when either perceived discrimination is low or nonprejudicial goals are weak. However, IAT scores should be unrelated to feeling thermometer scores when perceived discrimination is high and at the same time nonprejudicial goals are strong.

To test these predictions, standardized scores of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks were regressed to standardized scores of “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks, nonprejudicial goals, perceived discrimination, and all of their possible interactions (see Table 3). Consistent with our predictions, this regression analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction. The specific pattern of this interaction is depicted in Figure 2. Simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) revealed that “implicit” prejudice was positively related to “explicit” prejudice when perceived discrimination was high but nonprejudicial goals were weak, $B = .44$, $SE = .23$, $t(132) = 1.94$, $p = .05$, as well as when nonprejudicial goals were strong but perceived discrimination was weak, $B = .44$, $SE = .18$, $t(132) = 2.52$, $p = .01$. In contrast, “implicit” prejudice showed a tendency for a negative relation to “explicit” prejudice when perceived discrimination was high and at the same time nonprejudicial goals were strong, $B = -.29$, $SE = .16$, $t(132) = -1.89$, $p = .06$. Unexpectedly, participants low in perceived discrimination and weak nonprejudicial goals showed relatively high levels of “explicit” prejudice irrespective of their level of “implicit” prejudice, $B = .02$, $SE = .19$, $t(132) = 0.12$, $p = .90$.

In order to test whether these effects depend on procedural aspects of the IAT, the two variants (i.e., personalized vs. standard) were dummy coded and entered as an additional between-subjects variable to the regression. This analysis indicated that the obtained three-way interaction was *not* qualified by the specific IAT variant, as reflected by a nonsignificant four-way interaction including IAT variant as an additional factor, $B = .06$, $SE = .27$, $t(124) = .23$, $p = .82$. Neither the main effect of IAT variant nor any of its interaction effects reached statistical significance (all $ts < 1.05$; all $ps > .29$). The three-way interaction pattern was identical for the two IAT variants.

Discussion

Results from Study 1 provide preliminary support for the proposed integrative framework. Consistent with

TABLE 3: Regression Coefficients for Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks as Predicted by Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (IAT), Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), and Their Interactions, Study 1

	B	SE	t	p
Intercept	-.05	.08	-0.64	.52
IAT	.15	.09	1.65	.10
NPG	-.01	.09	-0.17	.87
PD	-.20	.09	-2.24	.03
IAT × NPG	-.08	.10	-0.82	.42
IAT × PD	-.08	.10	-0.80	.42
NPG × PD	.10	.06	1.56	.12
IAT × NPG × PD	-.29	.13	-2.28	.02

NOTE: Perceived discrimination was assessed with McConahay's (1986; Table 2) Modern Racism Scale; nonprejudicial goals were assessed with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale; “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz's (1998) standard version of the Implicit Association Test or Olson and Fazio's (2004) personalized variant of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). $R^2 = .164$; adjusted $R^2 = .120$.




Figure 2 Relation Between “Implicit” Preference for Whites Over Blacks in the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and “Explicit” Preference for Whites Over Blacks As a Function of Perceived Discrimination (PD) and Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Study 1.

our predictions, “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks (as measured by two variants of the IAT) was positively related to “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks (as measured by a feeling thermometer scale) when (a) perceived discrimination of Black people was high but nonprejudicial goals were weak and (b) nonprejudicial goals were strong but perceived discrimination of Black people was low. In contrast, “implicit” prejudice scores tended to show a negative relation to “explicit” prejudice scores when nonprejudicial goals were strong and at the same time perceived discrimination

was high. This negative relation is consistent with the results of earlier studies showing similar tendencies when cognitive inconsistency led to a rejection of affective reactions as a basis for evaluative judgments (e.g., Gawronski & Strack, 2004). A possible interpretation of such reversals is that attempts to counteract the influence of affective reactions on evaluative judgments increase as a function of the strength of these reactions (Fazio & Olson, 2003).

In addition to these results, there was also an unexpected finding for participants with low scores on both perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals. Even though we expected a positive relation between “implicit” and “explicit” preference scores for these participants, they showed relatively high levels of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks irrespective of their level of “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. This pattern suggests that some people may show no negative affective reactions toward racial minority groups but nevertheless judge these groups negatively. However, given that this pattern was not anticipated, it seems premature to draw strong conclusions from this result as long as it is not clear whether it reflects a replicable, systematic effect or simply a random outcome of the present study. Thus, we will defer a more detailed discussion of this finding to the General Discussion.

STUDY 2

The main goal of Study 2 was to replicate the pattern obtained in Study 1 with a different measure of “implicit” prejudice. This goal was stimulated by two issues. First, even though Study 1 showed corresponding effects for the standard IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998) and the personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004), the general procedure of the IAT has been criticized for several reasons that apply to both the personalized and the standard variant (e.g., Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001; Mierke & Klauer, 2003; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Thus, it seems desirable to replicate the obtained effects with a different measure that is not susceptible to these task-related criticisms. Second, we aimed to test whether the obtained independence of “implicit” and “explicit” prejudice for participants with low scores on both perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals is simply a random outcome or a replicable, systematic effect. For these purposes, Study 2 aimed to replicate the pattern obtained in Study 1 using a variant of Payne et al.’s (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) as a measure of “implicit” prejudice.

Method

Participants. In Study 2, 79 students at the University of Western Ontario (64 female; 15 male) participated in a study on “imagination, belief, and attitudes.” Participants received CDN \$10 for their participation in a 1-hour session. Due to a computer error, data from 2 participants were only partially recorded and thus were excluded from analyses. Also, 5 participants identified themselves as Black or African. Excluding these participants from analyses did not change any of the results reported in the following.

Measures. The self-report measures were identical to those employed in Study 1. To assess immediate affective reactions, we used a variant of Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP. On each trial of the task, participants were first presented with a fixation cross for 1000 ms, which was then replaced by a picture of the face of either a Black or a White male for 75 ms. Control trials involved the presentation of a grey square. The presentation of the prime stimuli was followed by a blank screen for 125 ms, after which a Chinese character appeared for 100 ms. The Chinese character was then replaced by a black-and-white pattern mask, and participants had to indicate whether they considered the presented character as more pleasant or less pleasant than the average Chinese character. The pattern mask remained on the screen until participants gave their response. Participants were asked to press a right-hand key (*Numpad 5*) if they considered the Chinese character as more pleasant than the average Chinese character and a left-hand key (*A*) if they considered the Chinese character as less pleasant than average. Following the instructions employed by Payne et al., participants were told that the pictures can sometimes bias people’s responses to the Chinese characters and that they should try their absolute best not to let the pictures influence their judgments of the Chinese characters. The task included 24 trials for each of the two prime categories (i.e., Black, White) and 24 filler trials using a grey square as prime stimulus for a total of 72 trials. As prime stimuli, we used pictures of 12 Black and 12 White male faces, each face being presented twice during the task. As target stimuli, we used a pool of 72 distinct Chinese characters, which were randomly selected by the computer. Both prime and target stimuli were adapted from Payne et al. Order of trials was randomized for each participant.

Results

Preliminary analyses. AMP scores were aggregated by calculating the proportion of more pleasant responses for each of the two prime categories (i.e., Black, White), respectively. Scores of “implicit” preference for Whites

TABLE 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (EP), and Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (AMP), Study 2

	N	M	SD
PD	77	3.54	0.72
NPG	77	3.17	0.55
EP	77	0.23	1.53
AMP	77	0.01	0.20

NOTE: Perceived discrimination was assessed with McConahay's (1986; Table 2) Modern Racism Scale; nonprejudicial goals were assessed with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; "explicit" preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale; "implicit" preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart's (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure.

TABLE 5: Zero-Order Correlations Between Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (EP), and Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks Assessed (AMP), Study 2

	PD	NPG	EP	AMP
1. PD	(.75)			
2. NPG	.24*	(.77)		
3. EP	-.05	-.03	(—)	
4. AMP	-.03	-.09	.28*	(.51)

NOTE: Perceived discrimination was assessed with McConahay's (1986; Table 2) Modern Racism Scale; nonprejudicial goals were assessed with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; "explicit" preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale; "implicit" preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart's (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure. Cronbach's α estimates of internal consistency are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$.

over Blacks were calculated by subtracting the proportion of more pleasant responses for Black priming trials from the proportion of more pleasant responses for White priming trials. Thus, higher values indicate a stronger "implicit" preference for Whites over Blacks. Ratings on the feeling thermometer scale, the Modern Racism Scale (i.e., perceived discrimination), and the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (i.e., nonprejudicial goals) were aggregated according to the procedures described for Study 1. Ratings were again aggregated such that higher values indicate higher perceived discrimination and stronger nonprejudicial goals, respectively. Means and standard deviations of all variables are reported in Table 4.

Correlations. Correlations between all measures are reported in Table 5. Scores of "implicit" preference for Whites over Blacks were significantly correlated with "explicit" preference for Whites over Blacks. In addition, nonprejudicial goals showed a significant positive

TABLE 6: Regression Coefficients for Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks as Predicted by Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (AMP), Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), and Their Interactions, Study 2

	B	SE	t	p
Intercept	.00	.11	0.02	.98
AMP	.33	.13	2.57	.01
NPG	.06	.12	0.51	.61
PD	-.03	.12	0.27	.78
AMP \times NPG	-.18	.14	-1.27	.21
AMP \times PD	.08	.18	0.41	.68
NPG \times PD	.01	.11	0.08	.94
AMP \times NPG \times PD	-.43	.20	-2.10	.04

NOTE: Perceived discrimination was assessed with McConahay's (1986; Table 2) Modern Racism Scale; nonprejudicial goals were assessed with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale; "explicit" preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with a feeling thermometer scale; "implicit" preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart's (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). $R^2 = .140$; adjusted $R^2 = .053$.

correlation with perceived discrimination such that higher levels of perceived discrimination were associated with stronger nonprejudicial goals. No other correlation reached statistical significance.

Regression analyses. Standardized scores of "explicit" preference for Whites over Blacks were regressed to standardized scores of "implicit" preference for Whites over Blacks, nonprejudicial goals, perceived discrimination, and all of their possible interactions (see Table 6). Replicating the findings of Study 1, this regression analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction. The specific pattern of this interaction is depicted in Figure 3. Consistent with our predictions, simple slope analyses revealed that "implicit" prejudice was positively related to explicit prejudice when perceived discrimination was high but nonprejudicial goals were weak, $B = .82$, $SE = .38$, $t(69) = 2.18$, $p = .03$, as well as when nonprejudicial goals were strong but perceived discrimination was low, $B = .67$, $SE = .24$, $t(69) = 2.81$, $p = .006$. In contrast, "implicit" prejudice was unrelated to "explicit" prejudice when perceived discrimination was high and at the same time nonprejudicial goals were strong, $B = -.01$, $SE = .31$, $t(69) = -0.05$, $p = .96$. Replicating the unexpected pattern obtained in Study 1, "explicit" and "implicit" prejudice were again unrelated for participants with low perceived discrimination and weak nonprejudicial goals, $B = -.16$, $SE = .32$, $t(69) = -0.51$, $p = .61$. However, in contrast to Study 1, these participants showed only moderate (rather than particularly high) scores in the present study.




Figure 3 Relation Between “Implicit” Preference for Whites Over Blacks in the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) and “Explicit” Preference for Whites Over Blacks As a Function of Perceived Discrimination (PD) and Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Study 2.

Discussion

Results from Study 2 provide further support for the proposed integrative framework in terms of associative and propositional processes. Replicating the pattern obtained in Study 1, “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks (as measured by a variant of the AMP) were positively related to “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks (as measured by a feeling thermometer scale) when (a) perceived discrimination of Black people was high but nonprejudicial goals were weak and (b) nonprejudicial goals were strong but perceived discrimination of Black people was low. In contrast, “implicit” prejudice scores were unrelated to “explicit” prejudice scores when nonprejudicial goals were strong and at the same time perceived discrimination was high. In addition to these findings, Study 2 also replicated the unexpected pattern for participants with low scores on perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals. For these participants, “implicit” prejudice scores were again unrelated to “explicit” prejudice scores. However, in contrast to the relatively high levels of “explicit” prejudice obtained in Study 1, this particular group of participants showed moderate scores in the present study.

STUDY 3

Despite the supportive evidence obtained in Studies 1 and 2, one could object that the employed self-report measures do not perfectly capture the particular constructs of our integrative framework. For instance, both the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986) as well as the Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale

(Dunton & Fazio, 1997) include several items that are not directly related to perceived discrimination or egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. To be sure, the use of these established measures seems valuable as it allows direct comparisons with previous research findings. However, the use of these measures can also be regarded as dysfunctional as they may not be pure reflections of the constructs proposed in our framework. This issue seems particularly important for the interpretation of the unexpected pattern obtained for participants with low perceived discrimination and weak nonprejudicial goals. Specifically, it is possible that this unexpected pattern was driven by the conflation of different constructs in the two self-report measures. A similar concern could be raised about the employed feeling thermometer ratings, which assess evaluative responses toward abstract categories without any exposure to individual exemplars of these categories. This situation is different in the IAT and the AMP, which generally involve the presentation of exemplars representing the category. Thus, it is possible that our findings were driven by the lack of exposure to individual exemplars in the feeling thermometers rather than by the particular processes proposed by our framework.

To address these concerns, Study 3 aimed at replicating the present findings using two newly developed self-report measures that were particularly designed to assess perceived discrimination and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. In addition, Study 3 included likeability ratings of exemplars of the two categories to rule out method-related confoundings pertaining to our measures of “implicit” and “explicit” prejudice.

Method

Participants. In Study 3, 98 students at the University of Western Ontario (67 female; 31 male) participated in a study on “attitudes and decision making.” Participants received CDN \$10 for their participation in a 1-hour session. Due to a computer malfunction, data from 2 participants were only partially recorded and thus excluded from analyses. In addition, we excluded data from 1 participant who repeatedly pressed the same key on all trials of the AMP. Finally, 3 participants identified themselves as Black or African. Excluding these participants from analyses did not change any of the results reported in the following.

Measures. The AMP was largely identical to the one employed in Study 2, the only exception being that we used a different set of pictures as prime stimuli. This set included color headshots of 10 White and 10 Black males. The AMP comprised a total of 90 trials, with each of the 20 faces being presented three times during

the task. On the remaining 30 trials, a grey square was presented as prime stimulus. To assess “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks, we used the same feeling thermometer ratings employed in Studies 1 and 2. In addition, participants were asked to rate how much they liked each of the 10 White and 10 Black males presented in the AMP on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*). To assess perceived discrimination and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals, we created two new scales, provided in the appendix. These scales were created by selecting suitable items from published scales (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986; Swim et al., 1995) and creating new items that were particularly designed for the purpose of the present study. The two scales showed satisfying reliabilities with Cronbach’s alpha values of .85 (perceived discrimination) and .77 (nonprejudicial goals).

Results

Preliminary analyses. AMP scores were aggregated according to the procedures described in Study 2. Ratings on the perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals scales were aggregated by first recoding items with a negative polarization and then calculating the respective mean values for each of the two scales. Ratings were aggregated such that higher values indicate higher perceived discrimination and stronger nonprejudicial goals, respectively. Scores of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks were calculated by first subtracting the mean feeling thermometer ratings of Blacks from mean ratings of Whites. In addition, we subtracted the mean likeability ratings of all Black faces from the mean likeability ratings of all White faces. The two difference scores were then standardized and averaged to serve as our main dependent measure of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. Means and standard deviations of all variables are reported in Table 7.

Correlations. Correlations between measures are reported in Table 8. The only significant correlation obtained in the present study was between “implicit” and “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks. No other correlation reached statistical significance.

Regression analyses. Standardized scores of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks were regressed to standardized scores of “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks, nonprejudicial goals, perceived discrimination, and all of their possible interactions, revealing a significant three-way interaction (see Table 9). The specific pattern of this interaction is depicted in Figure 4. Replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2, simple slope

TABLE 7: Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (EP), and Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (AMP), Study 3

	N	M	SD
PD	95	3.28	0.70
NPG	95	3.91	0.61
EP (exemplars)	95	0.69	1.01
EP (category)	95	0.20	1.88
AMP	95	0.07	0.21

NOTE: Perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals were assessed with newly developed scales listed in the appendix; “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with feeling thermometer scales pertaining to the two categories and likeability ratings of White and Black exemplars; “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart’s (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP).

TABLE 8: Zero-Order Correlations Between Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (EP), and Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks Assessed (AMP), Study 3

	PD	NPG	EP	AMP
1. PD	(.85)			
2. NPG	.06	(.77)		
3. EP	-.01	.06	(—)	
4. AMP	.04	-.19	.25*	(.71)

NOTE: Perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals were assessed with newly developed scales listed in the appendix; “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with feeling thermometer scales pertaining to the two categories and likeability ratings of White and Black exemplars (combined z scores); “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart’s (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). Cronbach’s α estimates of internal consistency are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$.

analyses revealed that “implicit” prejudice was positively related to explicit prejudice when perceived discrimination was high but nonprejudicial goals were weak, $B = .45$, $SE = .11$, $t(87) = 4.09$, $p = .0001$, as well as when nonprejudicial goals were strong but perceived discrimination was low, $B = .45$, $SE = .14$, $t(87) = 3.28$, $p = .001$. In contrast, “implicit” prejudice was unrelated to “explicit” prejudice when perceived discrimination was high and at the same time nonprejudicial goals were strong, $B = -.05$, $SE = .12$, $t(87) = -0.42$, $p = .68$. Replicating the unexpected pattern obtained in Studies 1 and 2, “explicit” and “implicit” prejudice were again unrelated for participants with low perceived discrimination and weak nonprejudicial goals, $B = -.05$, $SE = .13$, $t(87) = -0.43$, $p = .67$. As with Study 2, these participants showed moderate scores of “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks irrespective of “implicit” preference scores.

TABLE 9: Regression Coefficients for Explicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks as Predicted by Implicit Preference for Whites Over Blacks (AMP), Perceived Discrimination (PD), Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), and Their Interactions, Study 3

	B	SE	t	p
Intercept	-.01	.07	-0.20	.84
AMP	.20	.07	2.68	.01
NPG	.10	.07	1.34	.18
PD	-.12	.08	-1.61	.11
AMP × NPG	-.04	.07	-0.64	.52
AMP × PD	.00	.06	0.04	.99
NPG × PD	-.03	.06	-0.55	.59
AMP × NPG × PD	-.22	.06	-3.72	< .01

NOTE: Perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals were assessed with newly developed scales listed in the appendix; “explicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with feeling thermometer scales pertaining to the two categories and likeability ratings of White and Black exemplars (combined z scores); “implicit” preference for Whites over Blacks was assessed with Payne, Cheng, Govorun, and Stewart’s (2005) Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP). $R^2 = .205$; adjusted $R^2 = .141$.

Discussion

Results from Study 3 provide further support for our integrative framework, showing that the results obtained in Studies 1 and 2 are independent of possible confluents of other constructs in the employed self-report measures. Specifically, Study 3 replicated the obtained pattern of results using two newly designed self-report measures of perceived discrimination and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. In addition, Study 3 included likeability ratings of individual exemplars of the two categories to rule out method-related confoundings between our measures of “explicit” and “implicit” evaluations. Notably, the present study also replicated the unexpected pattern for participants with low perceived discrimination and weak nonprejudicial goals, who generally showed moderate scores of “explicit” prejudice irrespective of “implicit” prejudice.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The main goal of the present research was to propose a new integrative framework for the study of different forms of racial prejudice. Drawing on the distinction between associative and propositional processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we argued that evaluative responses to racial groups can be rooted in two qualitatively different mechanisms: (a) the *activation* of associations in memory and (b) the propositional *validation* of evaluations and beliefs. Whereas activated associations determine the evaluative quality

of immediate affective reactions, propositional validation processes provide the basis for evaluative judgments. Moreover, we argued that people typically base their evaluative judgments on their immediate affective reactions unless the evaluation implied by these reactions is inconsistent with other judgment-relevant beliefs. In this case, the resulting inconsistency has to be resolved by rejecting at least one of the relevant propositions or by finding a new proposition that resolves the inconsistency (Gawronski & Strack, 2004).

Applied to racial prejudice, we argued that negative affective reactions to a racial group may be inconsistent with strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals and high levels of perceived discrimination (see Figure 1, Panel A). Thus, in order to avoid cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), people may reject either (a) the proposition reflecting nonprejudicial goals, (b) the proposition reflecting perceived discrimination, or (c) the proposition reflecting a negative evaluation of the group. First, if people maintain cognitive consistency by rejecting nonprejudicial goals (see Figure 1, Panel B), they can still base their evaluative judgments on their negative affective reactions even when they believe that the group is a target of discrimination. This case plays a significant role in theories of *old-fashioned racism*: People simply do not care about egalitarian, nonprejudicial values and openly support racial discrimination (McConahay, 1986). Second, if people maintain consistency by rejecting the proposition that the group is disadvantaged (see Figure 1, Panel C), they can still base their judgments on their negative affective reactions even when they have strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals. This case plays a central role in theories of *modern racism*: People deny the continued discrimination of racial minority groups (McConahay, 1986). Finally, if people hold strong nonprejudicial goals and at the same time believe that the group is a target of discrimination (see Figure 1, Panel D), they may reject their negative affective reactions as a basis for evaluative judgments about the group even though this rejection does not necessarily change the affective reaction itself (Gawronski & Strack, 2004). This case can be regarded as the one described in theories of *aversive racism*: People hold strong egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals and believe that racial minority groups are still disadvantaged but nevertheless experience negative feelings toward these groups even though these feelings are not reflected in negative judgments (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004).

In the present research, we tested a particular implication of this theorizing, namely, the interactive effect of perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals on the relation between immediate affective reactions—as reflected in measures of “implicit” prejudice—and direct




Figure 4 Relation Between “Implicit” Preference for Whites Over Blacks in the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP) and “Explicit” Preference for Whites Over Blacks As a Function of Perceived Discrimination (PD) and Nonprejudicial Goals (NPG), Study 3.

evaluative judgments—as reflected in feeling thermometer scores of “explicit” prejudice. Specifically, we predicted that direct evaluative judgments should reflect the valence of immediate affective reactions when either perceived discrimination or nonprejudicial goals are low. However, direct evaluative judgments should be unrelated to affective reactions when both perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals are high. These predictions were supported in three studies using two variants of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; Olson & Fazio, 2004) and Payne et al.’s (2005) AMP as measures of “implicit” prejudice.

An Unexpected, Replicable Finding

Even though our predictions were largely confirmed by the present data, there was also an unpredicted finding for participants with weak nonprejudicial goals and low perceived discrimination. In contrast to the assumption that these participants would base their evaluative judgments on their immediate affective reactions, “explicit” prejudice scores were generally unrelated to “implicit” prejudice for this particular group. This pattern consistently emerged in all studies reported in the present article. In addition, we replicated this pattern in a yet unpublished application of the present framework to prejudice against overweight people (Brochu, Esses, & Gawronski, 2007).

There are several noteworthy aspects of this finding. First, in developing our integrative model, we tended to focus on the three possible cases that involved a rejection of *one* of three relevant propositions (see Figure 1). This focus was inspired by the intended integration of old-fashioned, modern, and aversive prejudice. For these three cases, our predictions have been generally

confirmed. However, these three cases differ from the one producing the unexpected outcome such that the latter involves a rejection of *two* relevant propositions. Thus, our discovery points to a case that has not yet been discussed in the prejudice literature, which may stimulate future research in this area.

Second, even though the pattern obtained for participants with weak nonprejudicial goals and low perceived discrimination was not expected, it does not contradict the core assumptions of our integrative model. One of the central tenets of our model is that people aim to avoid cognitive inconsistency among their race-related beliefs. This core assumption would be challenged if some people exhibit an inconsistent system of beliefs (e.g., if they endorse all three components depicted in Figure 1, Panel A). However, this is not the case for participants with weak nonprejudicial goals and low perceived discrimination as the latter two components are consistent with any “explicit” evaluation of Black people. Thus, even though the obtained independence of “explicit” and “implicit” evaluations was not predicted, it does not challenge the core assumptions of our integrative framework.

Third, the obtained independence of “explicit” and “implicit” evaluations suggests that additional factors may contribute to the reliance on immediate affective reactions for evaluative judgments (for a review, see Hofmann, Gschwendner, Nosek, & Schmitt, 2005). Applied to the present framework, these factors may include other prejudice-related belief components that may contribute to (in)consistency within a person’s system of beliefs. For instance, applications of our integrative framework to prejudice against overweight people (Brochu et al., 2007) could be expanded by including subjective beliefs about personal responsibility. Other belief components that might be relevant in the case of racial prejudice are social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (Duckitt, 2006). Irrespective of the particular function of these constructs, our integrative framework suggests that these components should be analyzed from a cognitive consistency perspective. This perspective requires one to go beyond mere correlations between belief components to focus on their interactive relations in comprising an internally consistent system of beliefs. Thus, future research relating low levels in both perceived discrimination and nonprejudicial goals to other belief components may help to further clarify the obtained independence of “explicit” and “implicit” prejudice for this particular group of individuals.

Motivation to Control Prejudice

By investigating the joint impact of nonprejudicial goals and perceived discrimination on the relation

between “implicit” and “explicit” prejudice, the present research expands on previous studies showing similar effects for motivation to control prejudiced reactions (e.g., Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Hofmann, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2005; Payne et al., 2005). Specifically, these studies found that measures of “implicit” prejudice are correlated with measures of “explicit” prejudice only for participants low in motivation to control prejudice but not for participants high in motivation to control. This finding was also obtained in some of our own studies (e.g., Banse & Gawronski, 2003; Gawronski, Geschke, & Banse, 2003). However, we also failed to replicate the moderating effect of motivation to control prejudice in several unpublished studies. From the perspective of the present framework, the failure to replicate this effect may have at least two causes. First, the present findings indicate that high levels of motivation to control prejudice—or strong non-prejudicial goals—are *insufficient* to reduce the impact of negative affective reactions on the endorsement of negative evaluations. Rather, this reduction requires high levels in both motivation to control *and* perceived discrimination. Thus, the moderating influence of motivation to control prejudice may depend on contingent characteristics of the sample, namely, high levels of perceived discrimination. Second, several of the studies conducted so far used dependent measures that involve modern variants of prejudice (e.g., the Modern Racism Scale; McConahay, 1986). However, these measures do not involve a *direct* evaluation of the racial group (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). Instead, group evaluations in these measures are *indirect* in that they are inferred from participants’ responses to nonevaluative propositions (e.g., perceived discrimination). Even though these nonevaluative propositions *contribute* to the overt endorsement of negative evaluations by moderating the impact of affective reactions on evaluative judgments, they are not sufficient for a direct negative evaluation. As such, the moderating influence of motivation to control prejudiced reactions obtained in some studies may be spurious, such that it may be due to the correlation of the employed dependent measure to the overt endorsement of negative evaluations.

A Fourth Case

The main goal of the present research was to test a specific prediction of the proposed framework that involves the *rejection* of relevant propositions. However, it is important to note that inconsistency can also be resolved in a different way, namely, by a search for an additional proposition that resolves the inconsistency (Festinger, 1957). In research on cognitive dissonance, additional propositions of this kind are often represented

by situational explanations for counterattitudinal behavior (e.g., Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Gawronski & Strack, 2004). This idea can also be applied to the present framework. Specifically, people may resolve the inconsistency between negative evaluations, perceived discrimination, and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals by searching for an explanation that justifies a negative evaluation (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). For instance, people may judge a Black person negatively when this evaluation can be attributed to specific behaviors of that person. Such justification processes play a central role in research on aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004), showing that White participants’ behavior toward Blacks often did not differ from their behavior toward Whites under control conditions. However, when negative behavior could be attributed to factors other than racial prejudice, behavior toward Blacks tended to be more negative than behavior toward Whites (e.g., Gaertner, 1973). Our integrative framework implies that such negative behavior under conditions of attributional ambiguity should directly reflect the valence of immediate affective reactions. That is, immediate affective reactions should influence judgments and behavior when a potential inconsistency between negative affective reactions, nonprejudicial goals, and perceived discrimination can be resolved by an additional proposition. However, negative affective reactions should leave judgments and behavior unaffected when inconsistency is resolved by a rejection of negative affective reactions. This prediction goes beyond earlier findings showing that measures of “implicit” prejudice predict spontaneous but not deliberate behavior (e.g., Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), in that the relation between “implicit” prejudice and deliberate behavior should increase under conditions of attributional ambiguity.

Attributions of Prejudice

Throughout this article, the constructs of interest were described as reflecting “different forms of prejudice.” It is important to note however that this interpretation has been the subject of ongoing controversies in social psychology. For example, research in the tradition of modern racism has been criticized for inferring prejudice from measures that may simply reflect conservative political opinions (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). In a similar vein, research on “implicit” prejudice has been criticized for inferring prejudice from measures that may reflect cultural stereotypes rather than “personal animus” (Arkes & Tetlock, 2004). The present framework offers a new perspective on these controversies by specifying the relation between several different concepts. Specifically, the proposed conceptualization

agrees with previous criticism by arguing that measures of “implicit” prejudice or the Modern Racism Scale do not tap the *endorsement* of negative evaluations of racial groups. By definition, such an endorsement can be assessed only with measures implying a direct evaluation of these groups, such as feeling thermometers or likeability ratings (De Houwer, 2006). The present conceptualization also agrees with previous criticism that neither the denial of discrimination nor “implicit” negativity is sufficient for the endorsement of negative evaluations. However, the present conceptualization disagrees with previous criticism by arguing that both factors systematically contribute to the endorsement of negative evaluations of racial groups. Specifically, the present results indicate that negative affective reactions (as assessed by measures of “implicit” prejudice) directly translate into negative judgments of racial groups when perceived discrimination is low (i.e., high levels of modern racism) or nonprejudicial goals are weak (i.e., low levels of motivation to control prejudice). However, negative affective reactions do *not* translate into negative judgments when perceived discrimination is high and at the same time nonprejudicial goals are strong. Thus, theoretical controversies regarding the ontological nature of different forms of prejudice could possibly be resolved by focusing on the specific relations between the proposed concepts. In addition, incorporating the notion of cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957; Gawronski et al., in press) and recent theorizing on associative and propositional processes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Strack & Deutsch, 2004) may provide deeper insights into the underlying dynamics of different components in prejudice-related belief systems.

Conclusion

The framework proposed in the present research has two important implications. First, it integrates different components of racial prejudice by describing them from a cognitive consistency perspective. Second, it makes specific predictions regarding the interactive influence of perceived discrimination and egalitarianism-related, nonprejudicial goals on the relation between immediate affective reactions (or “implicit” prejudice) and direct evaluative judgments about racial groups. To be sure, the proposed integration is not exhaustive, as the overall system of race-related beliefs may include additional components that have not been addressed in the present research. Nevertheless, we argue that it may be useful to study the *interactive* relation between these components from a cognitive consistency perspective. The present research was intended as a first step in this direction.

APPENDIX ITEMS USED TO ASSESS PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION AND NONPREJUDICIAL GOALS IN STUDY 3

Reverse-coded items are marked with an asterisk. Responses were assessed with 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Perceived Discrimination

1. Discrimination against Black people is no longer a problem in Canada.*
2. Black people in Canada often miss out on good jobs due to racial discrimination.
3. On average, people in our society treat Black people and White people equally.*
4. Black people in Canada do not have the same employment opportunities that White people do.
5. Too many Black people still lose out on jobs because of their skin color.
6. Society has reached a point where Black and White people have equal opportunities.*
7. Black people in Canada still represent a disadvantaged minority group.
8. Black people are treated just like everyone else.*
9. Black people are still facing racial discrimination in Canada.
10. Black people, as a group, rarely encounter prejudice or racial discrimination.*

Nonprejudicial Goals

1. Negative evaluations of disadvantaged minority members are wrong.
2. In today's society, it is important that one is not perceived as prejudiced.
3. It is important to me that people do not think I am prejudiced.
4. I get angry with myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced.
5. It is never acceptable to express one's prejudices.
6. When speaking to minority members, it is important to me that they do not think I am prejudiced.
7. If I have prejudiced thoughts or feelings, I keep them to myself.
8. I feel guilty when I have negative thoughts or feelings about the members of disadvantaged minority groups.
9. I don't mind if I appear prejudiced.*
10. When I have negative thoughts about disadvantaged minority groups, I have no concerns expressing them.*

NOTES

1. Following De Houwer (2006), we use the terms *direct* and *indirect* to describe features of measurement procedures and the terms *explicit* and *implicit* to describe features of the constructs assessed by a particular measurement procedure. Moreover, given that the unconscious nature of the constructs assessed by indirect measures

seems equivocal (Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006) we use the terms *implicit* and *explicit* with quotation marks.

2. To avoid potential confusion, it is important to note that the distinction between associative and propositional processes should not be equated with the distinction between automatic and controlled processes. Whereas the terms *associative* and *propositional* define two distinct processes by means of their respective operating principles (i.e., activation vs. validation), the terms *automatic* and *controlled* refer to descriptive features of a process that require empirical confirmation. In the present research, we primarily refer to the operating principles of associative and propositional principles while being agnostic about whether the two processes operate in an automatic or controlled fashion (for a more detailed discussion, see Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007).

3. An alternative strategy to resolve inconsistency is to “search for consonant information” (Festinger, 1957), which implies the addition of a new proposition rather than the rejection of an old proposition (Gawronski & Strack, 2004). This strategy is discussed in more detail in the General Discussion.

4. To provide a better proxy of perceived discrimination, the present studies used the original Modern Racism Scale variant reported in Table 2 of McConahay (1986).

5. Note that the present coding of perceived discrimination is opposite to the standard coding of the Modern Racism Scale, in which higher scores typically reflect a lower level of perceived discrimination.

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